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An agent who lacks preferences and instead makes decisions using criteria that are costly to create
should select efficient sets of criteria, where the cost of making a given number of choice distinctions
is minimized. Under mild conditions, efficiency requires that binary criteria with only two categories
per criterion are chosen. When applied to the problem of determining the optimal number of digits
in an information storage device, this result implies that binary digits (bits) are the efficient solution,
even when the marginal cost of using additional digits declines rapidly to 0. This short paper pays
particular attention to the symmetry conditions entailed when sets of criteria are efficient.
1 Introduction
Suppose that agents, rather than forming a separate preference judgment for each pair of alternatives,
make decisions using criteria. A criterion orders a small number of categories, each of which consists
of many alternatives. The potential of a criterion to order alternatives within another criterion’s cate-
gories allow sets of criteria to generate large numbers of choice distinctions. If an agent has objective
preferences that can be inferred from a large set of sufficiently discriminating criteria, the agent will be
better off if more of the criterion orderings are discovered: the agent will then be able to determine the
optimal allocation from more choice sets. The uncovering of more criterion discriminations is costly,
however, and we therefore consider efficient points where the cost of making a given number of choice
distinctions is minimized.
This optimization problem seems to lead to a trade-off. Given a number of choice distinctions, an
agent could either use a large set of coarse criteria (criteria with only a small number of categories)
or a small set of finer, more discriminating criteria. We show under mild conditions that large sets
of coarse criteria always lead to reductions in decision-making costs. Binary criteria with only two
categories per criterion therefore provide the only efficient arrangement. Under mild restrictions on how
criteria are aggregated into decisions, binary criteria lead to rational choice functions, where decisions
are determined by a complete and transitive binary relation.
We apply our model to the problem of determining the optimal number of digits in an information
storage device. We show that, even if the marginal cost of additional digits declines rapidly to 0, binary
digits (bits) offer the efficient solution.
In this short paper, we pay particular attention to the symmetry conditions that are entailed when sets
of criteria are efficient. A full working paper [2] is available on-line.
2 An outline of the model
A criterion Ci is an asymmetric binary relation on a domain of alternatives X and a set of criteria is de-
noted C = {C1, ...,CN}. Two alternatives x and y are deemed Ci-equivalent if x and y share the same set
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of Ci-superior alternatives and the same set of Ci-inferior alternatives (see [1]). A Ci-category is a maxi-
mal set of Ci-equivalent alternatives and e(Ci) denotes the number of Ci-categories. The discrimination
vector of C is (e(C1), ...,e(CN)). A Ci is coarser than C′i if e(Ci)< e(C′i).
Let c be a choice function on a domain of finite subsets of X . Two alternatives x and y are in the
same choice class of c if c treats them interchangeably: first, when x is chosen and y is available then y
is chosen too, and second, if x but not y is available then x is chosen if and only if, when y is available
and not x, y is chosen.
A choice function c uses C , denoted (C ,c), if c does not make distinctions that are not already
present in the criteria: for each set of alternatives A that contains only alternatives that are in the same
Ci-category, i = 1, ...,N, there is a choice class of c that contains A.
Let κ(Ci) denote the cost of criterion Ci. We assume κ(Ci) is determined by the number of Ci-
categories and therefore also write κ(e) to denote the cost of a Ci with e categories. We assume that
the cost of a set of criteria, κ [C ], equals the sum of the costs of the criteria in C . Letting n(c) be the
number of choice classes in c, a pair (C ,c) is more efficient than the pair (C ′,c′) if n(c) ≥ n(c′) and
κ [C ] ≤ κ [C ′], with at least one strict inequality, and (C ,c) is efficient if there does not exist a (C ′,c′)
that is more efficient than (C ,c).
The fundamental advantage of criteria is that each criterion can discriminate within the categories of
other criteria. Given constraints that specify that criterion Ci can have no more than ei categories (and as-
suming that |X | is sufficiently large), we can find a (C ,c) such that (i) there is a partition of X with ∏Ni=1 ei
cells such that x and y are in distinct cells if and only if they lie in different Ci -categories for at least one i
and (ii) each cell of this partition forms a choice class of c. Subject to the ei constraints, this (C ,c) max-
imizes n(c) and accordingly we define (C ,c) to maximally discriminate if n(c) = min
[
∏Ni=1 e(Ci), |X |
]
.
3 Main results
(1) Since criteria with only one category make no discriminations and require no decisions, we assume
they are costless. To compare a (C ,c) and (C ′,c′) that have the same number of costly categories, sup-
pose that ∑Ni=1 (e(Ci)−1) = ∑N
′
i=1 (e(C′i)−1). Assume also that either (i) the marginal cost of categories
is increasing and the smaller of n(c) and n(c′) is less than the cardinality of X or (ii) the marginal costs
of categories is strictly increasing. We show that if C has greater proportions of coarser criteria than
does C ′ and if (C ,c) maximally discriminates, then (C ,c) is more efficient than (C ′,c′).
(2) Fix a set of domains that, for each finite m, contains a X with m elements and call a domain
admissible if it is drawn from this set. Then, every efficient (C ,c) where the domain is admissible has a
C that contains only binary criteria if and only if κ(e)> κ(2)⌈log2 e⌉ for all integers e > 2.
Thus the cost of e categories can rise as slowly as log2 e – in which case the marginal cost of categories
descends to 0 – and still the only efficient arrangement is for all criteria to be binary.
(3) We apply the result in (2) to information storage. Suppose we wish to store some integer between
1 and n using N k-ary digits and that the cost of storage equals κ(k)N. We show that, for all positive
integers n, binary digits are the minimum-cost storage method if and only if κ(k)> κ(2)⌈log2 k⌉ for all
integers k > 2.
(4) We specify axioms for how to aggregate sets of criteria into choice functions that generalize
weighted voting. Suppose that the choice function c in the pair (C ,c) satisfies these axioms, that C
contains only binary criteria, and that c satisfies the following Condorcet rule: if there is a x in a choice
set A that is chosen by c from all {x,y} with y ∈ A then x is chosen from A too. Then c makes selections
that maximize a complete and transitive binary relation. Given (2), we conclude that in a broad range of
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cases, efficient decision-making is rational.
4 Symmetry and maximal categorization
Maximal discrimination is necessary for decision-making efficiency since otherwise n(c) could be in-
creased without an increase in costs. The key feature required for a (C ,c) to maximally discriminate is
that the following property of C , called maximal categorization, is satisfied: the discrimination partition
P of X that places x and y in distinct cells if and only if x and y lie in different Ci -categories for at least
one i must have ∏Ni=1 e(Ci) cells.
We will now see that if X is a product of attributes and each criterion orders a distinct attribute, then
maximal categorization is satisfied and conversely if maximal categorization is satisfied then we can label
alternatives so that X becomes a product of attributes. By joining this conclusion to result (2), that only
binary criteria are efficient, we can describe efficient decision-making concisely: to be efficient agents
must be able to describe the alternatives in X so that they form a product of attributes and each criterion
must divide a distinct attribute into exactly two categories.
The simplest way to achieve maximal categorization is for X to be formed by a product of attributes
and for each Ci to divide X into categories based only on attribute i. The domain X might be a set of
cars, and the attributes might be colors, top speeds, and prices. A ‘speed’ Ci would then order cars based
on the ranges of top speeds that Ci deems to be equivalent.
Formally, an attribute is a set Xi and N attributes define the domain of alternatives X = ∏Ni=1 Xi. We
will say that a set of criteria C is based on a product of attributes if for each Ci there is a set Xi and a
partition of {X1i , ...,X
e(Ci)
i } of Xi such that the categories of Ci are the sets X
j
i ×
(
∏k 6=i Xk
)
, j = 1, ...,e(Ci).
So, if Ci is an ordering of cars by color then each X ji would represent a color and x and y would be placed
into distinct Ci-categories if and only if the ith coordinates of x and y indicate different colors: xi ∈ X ji
and yi ∈ X ki where j 6= k. The cells of the discrimination partition P would then be the ∏Ni=1 e(Ci) sets
X j11 × ·· · ×X
jN
N where, for each i, ji is an integer between 1 and e(Ci). Maximal categorization thus
obtains.
This treatment assumes that X is a product space: for each possible combination of attributes (each
possible color-speed-price combination), there is a corresponding element of X . But for maximal catego-
rization it is enough that there is some alternative in X for each combination of attribute ranges specified
by the criteria, that is, it is sufficient for X to be a subset of ∏Ni=1 Xi such that each X j11 × ·· · × X jNN
intersects X .
A set of criteria C that is based on a product of attributes enjoys a wide-ranging symmetry property.
Fix some Ci in C , and consider a set E−i formed by an arbitrary union of the categories of the remaining
criteria C j, j 6= i. Given the product structure of C , any such E−i must intersect each of the Ci-categories.
To continue the car example, the set of cars E−i defined by a certain range of top speeds and prices can
be partitioned into all the possible color subsets, say blue, red, and yellow. If we use Ci to order the cells
of the color partition of the cars in E−i, the ordering will have the same ‘shape’ as – be order isomorphic
to – the original color ordering Ci of X . If, for example, Ci on X is a cycle – blue is better than red which
is better than yellow which is better than blue – then the Ci ordering of any set of cars defined by a range
of speeds and prices will also form a cycle. We conclude that any two sets of cars Y and Z defined by
selections of non-color attributes will be order isomorphic to each other when each is endowed with the
color ordering Ci (or rather the restrictions of Ci to Y and Z).
This symmetry property may seem to be of limited value since it appears to apply only to products of
attributes. But in fact the symmetry property characterizes any C that maximally categorizes. If for an
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arbitrary (possibly nonproduct) C , we apply Ci to some E−i and it defines fewer than e(Ci) Ci-category
subsets then the discrimination partition P would have to contain fewer than ∏Ni=1 e(Ci) cells. And the
only way that E−i and E ′−i can each define e(Ci)Ci-category subsets is for the Ci ordering of these subsets
to be order isomorphic.
Moreover, if an arbitrary (possibly nonproduct) C enjoys the symmetry property we can relabel the
elements of the domain X so that C is then based on a product of attributes. To do this, we associate
each Ci with an attribute (e.g., color) and identify each Ci-category with an arbitrary value X ji for that
attribute (e.g., blue): each cell of P is thus identified with a vector of attribute values. So, although a
product of attributes looks special, it provides a model for any set of criteria that maximally categorizes.
The following definitions and theorem make these claims precise. We use E1i , ...,E
e(Ci)
i to denote the
categories of criterion Ci.
Given the set of criteria {C1, ...,CN}, E−i is a union of C−i-categories if E−i =⋃ j E jk for some collec-
tion of criterion categories {E jk} such that k 6= i for each j. Let CE−ii denote the binary relation defined
by E CE−ii E ′ if and only if there are Ci-categories Ei and E ′i such that E = Ei ∩ E−i, E ′ = E ′i ∩ E−i, and
xCi y for x ∈ E and y ∈ E ′. We then say C satisfies the order-isomorphism property if for any i and any
two unions of C−i-categories, E−i and E ′−i, the binary relations C
E−i
i and C
E ′−i
i are order-isomorphic.
The set of criteria C has a product representation if (i) for each i, there is a nonempty set Yi and a
partition {Y 1i , ...,
Y e(Ci)i } of Yi, (ii) there is a set of criteria Ĉ = {Ĉ1, ...,ĈN} defined on Y = ∏Ni=1Yi where the categories
of each Ĉi are the sets Y ji ×
(
∏k 6=iYk
)
, and (iii) for each i, there is a order-preserving bijection f between
the categories of Ci and Ĉi, that is, E ji CiE
j′
i if and only if f
(
E ji
)
Ĉi f
(
E j
′
i
)
.
We then have the following result.
Theorem. For a set of criteria C , the following statements are equivalent: (i) C maximally categorizes,
(ii) C satisfies the order-isomorphism property, (iii) C has a product representation.
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